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Abstract—The incredible popularity of the Android mo-
bile operating system has resulted in a massive influx
of malicious applications for the platform. This malware
can come from a number of sources as Google allows
the installation of Android App Packages (APKs) from
third parties. Even within its own Google Play storefront,
however, malicious software can be found.
One type of approach to identify malware focuses on the
structural properties of the function call graphs (FCGs)
extracted from APKs. The aim of this research work is to
test the robustness of one example method in this category,
named the ACTS (App topologiCal signature through
graphleT Sampling) method. By extracting graphlet statis-
tics from a FCG, the ACTS approach is able to efficiently
differentiate between benign app samples and malware
with good accuracy.
In this work, we obfuscate the FCG of malware in several
ways, and test the ACTs method against these evasion
attacks. The statistical results of running ACTS against
unmodified real malware samples is compared with the
results of ACTS running against obfuscated versions of
those same apps.
I. INTRODUCTION
Android is and likely will continue to be a remarkably
successful mobile platform. In fact, it powers more than
just smartphones and tablets - in recent years, several set-
top boxes and wearable devices have been released with
the operating system. However, as Android becomes
more and more ubiquitous, it also becomes a more
favorable target for malware developers.
Several methods have been proposed to detect and/or
defend against this malware, each with their own ben-
efits and drawbacks. App topoligiCal signature through
graphleT Sampling (ACTS) is one such approach, and
is the focus of this paper. It examines certain structural
features of an APK’s FCG, so chosen for its immunity to
lower-level instruction obfuscation and higher-level con-
tent encryption, among other things [1]. Namely, ACTS
uses the frequency distribution of various graphlets in
a function call graph. A graphlet is small connected
subgraph; in ACTS, they consist of no fewer than 3
nodes and no more than 5. The method takes advantage
of the fact the much of the malware on Android can
be grouped into families which often share some source
code and have some degree of similarities in their
structure [2].
There are some potential challenges to ACTS, how-
ever. While a FCG may be immune to certain afore-
mentioned obfuscation techniques, it may be particularly
vulnerable to useless functions and function calls; that
is, functions and function calls whose sole purpose is
to manipulate the FCG obtained from an APK file. A
malicious developer could strategically create functions
and/or function calls to manipulate the FCG of their
software to resemble a legitimate app, which in turn will
fool ACTS. Creating graphlets made up of the useless
functions will change their distribution statistics, which
is exactly the information that ACTS uses for detection.
We experiment with a few potential strategies a malware
developer may utilize to evade detection by ACTS. As
source code for Android malware is not readily available,
we instead directly modify the function call graphs
extracted from the malicious APK files via Androguard.
While less convenient, it is still reasonably feasible for
a malware developer to appropriately add functions and
function calls in the source code of their application.
Note that any modification we make to the FCG will
involve adding a function or function call, as removing
those may impair intended operation of the software.
The obfuscation strategies we test ACTS against in-
clude random edge (i.e. function call) insertion, creat-
ing graphlets via specific edge insertion, and creating
graphlets via specific edge and node (i.e. function call
and function) insertion. We examine two slight variations
of the latter two techniques that aim to reduce the amount
of new edges and/or nodes required to successfully
obfuscate the FCG. We also briefly discuss ways that
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a malicious developer could obfuscate his program that
we cannot adequately model by only modifying a FCG.
To summarize, the main contributions of this paper
are as follows:
• We identify and design various obfuscation tech-
niques a malicious Android application developer
can utilize to evade function call graph based mal-
ware detection methods.
• We implement and test these techniques using real
malware against the ACTS program and present our
results.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following
way: In section II, we provide the reader with an
overview of the ACTS scheme and give some necessary
background information. Section III details the various
obfuscation techniques we used in an attempt to evade
detection by ACTS. Section IV presents the results of
our experiment. The final three sections present related
work, potential future research, and concluding remarks,
respectively.
II. ACTS OVERVIEW
Now we will explore how ACTS works with a little
more detail. This section provides enough information to
understand how our evasion techniques are implemented,
but for a more comprehensive explanation of the pro-
gram, see [1]. The notation and visual representation we
use for graphlets, nodes, etc. are the same as they appear
in that paper. The steps ACTS takes to classify malicious
APK files is as follows:
A. Extracting the Function Call Graph
First, a function call graph is extracted from an APK
file. This FCG is directed graph that represents function
caller and callee relationships in a piece of software.
Androguard is used to extract a FCG from the Java
bytecode of an APK file.
B. Estimation of Graphlet Frequency Distribution
(GFD)
Next, ACTS considers the graphlets in the FCG. As
previously mentioned, a graphlet is a small, connected
Fig. 1. The thirteen unique graphlets with 3 nodes ω3,i(i = 1, 2, ...13)
subgraph of a FCG. These graphlets capture topological
information on local neighborhoods. The set of unique
graphlets with 3 nodes may be enumerated as ω3,i (i =
1, 2, ... 13). Graphical representation of this set is shown
in Fig. 1. There are 199 unique 4-node graphlets, 9,364
5-node graphlets, and 1,530,843 6-node graphlets. ACTS
only considers graphlets up to size 5, as any more than
that will significantly increase computational costs while
providing little extra accuracy.
ACTS uses the number of occurrences for each type
of graphlet to find the Graphlet Frequency Distribution
(GFD) of a Graph G. GFD is a vector of the probability
distribution of each graphlet type in G. To elaborate,
suppose that we enumerate every 3-node graphlet in G
(which is finite). Then, define f3,i to be the number
of times that graphlet ω3,i appears in G. Then, the
frequency distribution density d3,i = f3,i/Σ
13
i=1f3,i. The
vector (d3,1, d3,2, ...d3,13) is the 3-graphlet frequency
distribution (3-GFD) of G. Concatenate this with the 4-
GFD and 5-GFD (which will have 199 elements and
9,364 elements, respectively) to get the full 9,576-
dimensional Graphlet Frequency Distribution vector of
G.
Unfortunately, actually enumerating every graphlet in
a FCG is not feasible in a reasonable time frame. It is
possible to estimate graphlet distributions without doing
so, however. To accomplish this, ACTS makes use of
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (M-H algorithm) [3],
which is a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method,
to estimate the GFD of graph G. For further details on
the estimation method, see [3] or the appropriate section
of [1] for more information.
C. Projecting GFD Vector to Lower Dimension
In practice, ACTS does not use the entire GFD vector.
Instead, we consider the set of Android applications
for which the full GFD vectors have been obtained by
Peng et al [1]. From this set, we select graphlets which
have a density of 2 percent or more in at least one
application. As a result, the number of dimensions of
the GFD vector is reduced from 9,576 to 96 (5 3-node
graphlets, 20 4-node graphlets, and 71 5-node graphlets).
This step is necessary to avoid issues that many machine
learning algorithms have when dealing with vectors of
high dimensionality [4]. The new GFD vector is referred
to as the topological signature of an app.
D. Classification via Support Vector Machine
Lastly, ACTS uses the reduced GFD with the LIB-
SVM support vector machine (SVM) library to classify
its corresponding APK file as malicious or not, with
results of up to 87.9 percent accuracy.
Fig. 2. From left to right, the three obfuscation methods are: Random Edge Insertion (REI), Edges Only Graphlet Insertion (EOGI), and Edges
and Nodes Graphlet Insertion (ENGI). In REI, we see two new edges randomly added to the FCG. In EOGI, we see three edges added in such
a way to increase the distribution of ω3,4 graphlets, and in ENGI, we edges and nodes added in such a way to increase the distribution of ω3,5
graphlets.
III. METHOD
Here, we elaborate on the various obfuscation tech-
niques we employed on real malicious software in an
attempt to evade detection by ACTS. They can be briefly
summarized as follows:
1) Random Edge Insertion: We simply insert random
edges (i.e. function calls) on an APK’s FCG. This
serves as a sort of baseline that shows some degree
of robustness for ACTS, as well as how our other
strategies perform.
2) Edges Only Graphlet Insertion: We create only
edges in the FCG to link existing nodes so that they
form graphlets that do not appear often enough in
a malicious FCG.
3) Edges and Nodes Graphlet Insertion: We create
both edges and nodes to form graphlets that do
not appear often enough in a malicious FCG, and
form a few more edges to link back to the main
body of the graph.
Fig. 2 shows a visual representation of how each pre-
sented obfuscation strategy works.
A. Random Edge Insertion
The first technique we employ is Random Edge Inser-
tion (REI). It simply consists of randomly finding two
unconnected nodes in a graph G, and adding a directed
edge from one to the other. The amount of total edges
in G is increased by 50 percent to 100 percent.
This method may seem ultimately inconsequential
and a malware developer would likely not consider this
strategy in a real-world scenario, but there is some
rationale behind our decision to include it here. As
previously mentioned, Android malware can generally be
classified into one of several families which usually share
some code and underlying structure. This commonality
between malware is crucial to how ACTS functions.
Benign apps, on the other hand, presumably are not
nearly as closely related, so perhaps something as simple
as adding random edges to a FCG would enable the
malware to avoid detection.
At the very least, REI could be a heuristic indication
of ACTS’ resistance to basic obfuscation and a baseline
to measure our other methods against.
Fig. 3. These graphlets have the highest frequency distributions among
the function call graphs of benign Android applications.
B. Edges Only Graphlet Insertion
The second obfuscation strategy we use is Edges
Only Graphlet Insertion (EOGI). ACTS stores the GFD
of every APK sample it analyzes, as well as statistics
about the most common graphlets in malware and benign
software by average distribution. Essentially, we treat the
statistics of the benign software as a sort of target. We
examine the top five graphlets that appear in benign soft-
ware (see Fig. 3; it is identical to the results obtained by
[1]). We then look at the distribution of those graphlets
in the malicious FCG, and add edges to existing nodes
in order to increase the number of a particular graphlet.
These (unconnected) nodes are chosen randomly. So, for
example, if the extracted FCG G of some malware has
a relative shortage of graphlet ω3,5, we could randomly
select three unconnected nodes a, b, and c and add an
edge from a to b and from a to c. Each graphlet type
will require its own specific manipulation of the FCG.
The above example illustrates the basic concept of
EOGI, but we often deal with relatively large FCGs
that can have thousands of nodes. In the interest of
minimizing edge additions to optimize obfuscation, we
consider two slightly more sophisticated versions of this
method:
• The first involves adding a substructure that con-
tains multiple instances of a graphlet while lowering
the number of edges added per graphlet. Fig. 4
(a) illustrates the following example: consider the
previous scenario where a malicious FCG has a
shortage of graphlet ω3,5. Now we randomly select
6 nodes d, e, f, g, h, and i. Add an edge from d to
every other selected node. As the illustration shows,
this structures results in ten ω3,5 graphlets being
added even though only five edges were added;
much improved over adding three edges for one
graphlet. Similar to before, each graphlet will need
a specially designed substructure to achieve this
effect.
• The second version attempts to find existing sub-
graphlets in a FCG and add edges to transition it
into a specific graphlet. Going back to the scenario
Fig. 4. In (a) inserting that particular substructure increases the amount
of ω3,5 graphlets by 10. In (b), we add only one edge to create another
instance of graphlet ω3,5.
where there were too few ω3,5 graphlets, the process
is as follows (depicted in Fig. 4 (b)): select a
random node j. Ensure that it already has at least
one outgoing edge, and then add another edge to an
unconnected node. This forms at least one instance
of graphlet ω3,5. Once again, different graphlets
have different variations of this technique.
C. Edges and Nodes Graphlet Insertion
A weakness of EOGI is the potential ripple effect
that each added edge can have. Edges are often part
of numerous graphlets, and an added edge may inad-
vertently cause the distribution of undesirable graphlets
to increase. Additionally, it is possible to not even add
the correct graphlet with EOGI. Consider an attempt to
increase the distribution of graphlet ω3,5 by adding an
add edge to an existing subgraphlet that consists of two
nodes with one edge between them, as shown in Fig. 4
(b). However, if the node that an edge is being made to
already has an edge with another node in the graphlet
(i.e. if the bottom node is already connected to the top
node), it will cause the distribution of graphlet ω3,9 to
increase instead.
To mitigate the impact of this phenomenon, we con-
sider a third obfuscation strategy: Edges and Nodes
Graphlet Insertion (ENGI). By and large, it follows the
same logic as EOGI, but nodes are created instead of
selected. The two variations of ENGI are similar to those
of EOGI as well. The example presented in Fig. 4 can
just as easily be used to illustrate to ENGI. In the case
of the substructure insertion variant, ENGI’s distinction
is that nodes e, f, g, and h are created. Nodes d and
i are ones that already existed in the FCG, and are
used to connect the substructure to the main graph. GFD
estimation will not consider unconnected sections. When
using the graphlet transition variant of ENGI, the middle
and upper nodes as well as the upper edge are already
present in the FCG, while the bottom node and edge are
created.
IV. RESULTS
To test our obfuscation techniques, we considered 20
random FCGs that came from known malware. In ACTS,
these were all true positives; that is, correctly classified
as malware. We applied each technique on the samples
and recorded any difference in ACTS’ classification.
The results of our experiments are promising. As Fig. 5
shows, both ENGI’s and EOGI’s substructure insertion
variant performed well, both causing ACTS to change its
original correct malicious classification of 17 malicious
FCGs from a total of 20. EOGI’s substructure insertion
performance came as a surprise, however. Intuitively, the
number of unintended graphlet additions would leave
too much of an impact for good results (which we feel
may be the case for the graphlet transition variant of
EOGI), but the data indicates otherwise. The graphlet
transition version of ENGI also performed well with
14 misclassifications, though EOGI’s version did poorly
with only 6. REI’s poor performance suggests that even
though much of Android can fit into one of several
structural molds, simply disrupting this structure is not
enough. Legitimate pieces of software may not by as
easy to categorize, but there are still some conventions
in the source code that are reflected in a FCG. REI was
not able to reflect this in the modified graph.
A. Discussion
An important element of this obfuscation to consider
is practicality and cost for the malicious developer. We
found that the number of graphlets required to change
the GFD to a desirable value was anywhere from a few
hundred to several thousand, depending on the size of the
FCG and its current GFD. Often, however, this means
that the number of edges and nodes (when applicable)
increases by several times. While not necessarily dif-
ficult, adding all of those functions and function calls
to a program can be time-consuming. EOGI is more
feasible than ENGI, as only function calls are added.
There are several things that can be done to mitigate this
issue, however. Our implementation of the substructure
strategy involved six nodes and five edges, and resulted
in 10 graphlets being added. Adding another node and
edge to it would cause 15 graphlets to be added; yet
another node and edge would further increase that to
21, and so on. A large enough substructure will reduce
Fig. 5. This figure shows how many apps were misclassified by ACTS
after our obfuscation techniques were applied to them. Here, v1 is the
substructure insertion variant of EOGI/ENGI, and v2 is the graphlet
transition variant.
the workload. Adopting a similar idea with the graphlet
transition strategy would make it virtually indistinguish-
able from structure insertion; the only difference is that
it would guarantee the presence of a subgraphlet that
existed in the original FCG. Perhaps a more advanced
version of graphlet transition could identify multiple
subgraphlets or graphlets and connect them together to
create a desired substructure. The process of finding
suitable subgraphlets and graphlets may be non-trivial,
however. Additionally, the malicious developer is able to
remove or condense functions, which means he or she
can modify a FCG in new ways.
V. RELATED WORK
There is little to no research that focuses specifically
on obfuscating the function call graphs of applications
as we have done here. The idea itself of using a FCG to
detect malicious software is relatively novel. Obviously,
Peng et al. [1] created ACTS. [5] implements a similar
approach, though they also take into account features of
each node in the graph, not just the overall structure.
Testing our obfuscation techniques and devising new
ones to combat their detection could be interesting. FCG
analysis can also be used for other purposes; for instance,
Zhou and Jiang [6] use it to detect specific vulnerabilities
in Android applications.
VI. FUTURE WORK
Aside from further investigation and refinement of the
presented obfuscation techniques, there are two main
areas we believe will result in the most interesting and
practical related research. The first is studying other
FCG obfuscation techniques, especially ones that require
direct editing of the source code (and thus are impossible
to do with our own approach). One such example would
be function inlining, which essentially involves condens-
ing several function into one larger function. This could
enable the deletion of nodes and edges in the FCG, which
our approach was unable to do.
The second interesting area of future study is obfusca-
tion detection. Certain bytecode or structural clues could
potentially indicate FCG obfuscation. For instance, the
nodes (i.e. functions) added by ENGI would generally
exist only for other functions to call or be called by. Find-
ing these ”useless” functions even with just bytecode is
possible, and indeed could be gleaned by using [5]’s
FCG node and neighborhood analysis. [5] also found
that the average number of outgoing function calls from
a node is slightly above two, so detecting REI or EOGI
could be made possible by using that and perhaps other
statistics.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present practical obfuscation tech-
niques that malicious Android software developers could
implement in order to avoid FCG-based malware detec-
tion. Namely, we show the effectiveness of some of these
techniques against an example of this detection software:
ACTS. By adding edges or nodes and edges, we are able
to manipulate a malicious FCG to sufficiently change
its graphlet frequency distribution vector, thus fooling
ACTS into classifying it as benign software.
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